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Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004, xviiiþ 307 pp., £49.95 h/b.
WENDY LOWER TRIES TO DO THREE MAIN THINGS IN THIS AMBITIOUS BOOK. First, she
seeks to provide a ‘narrative of German colonial fantasies’ in the region, ‘within a broader
European context of exploration, conquest, migration, and mass destruction of indigenous
peoples’ (p. 19). In particular, she develops the comparison often made by Hitler himself
with British rule in India, though ultimately she ﬁnds it wanting. It is this ‘ideological
framework’ (p. 10) that she claims distinguishes her book from Karel Berkhoﬀ’s bottom-up
social history, which focuses more speciﬁcally on the experience of the local Ukrainian
population under occupation. Lower’s study mainly focuses on Zhytomyr, but she makes
brief reference to the Right Bank in the preceding inter-war period.
Lower’s second broad aim is to provide a micro-study of the Holocaust in Zhytomyr, where
‘the Germans and their local collaborators killed as many as 180,000 Jews between the summer
of 1941 and the autumn of 1943’ (p. 70). Third, Lower looks at German plans for the
colonisation of Ukraine, and for Zhytomyr in particular (an abundant agricultural land—its
Ukrainian name means ‘wheat-universe’ or ‘rye-paradise’). Zhytomyr was uniquely important
because Hitler’s ‘Werewolf’ ﬁeld headquarters was in the region, as was Himmler’s more modest
residence.
As regards Hitler’s statement that ‘what India was for England the territories of Russia will be
for us’ (quoted on p. 24), Lower initially seeks to argue that ‘the Nazi concept of empire-
building . . . drew its strength from vo¨lkisch utopian fantasies, the Lebensraum tradition of
continental migration, and the imperialistic Weltpolitik tradition of economic exploitation’
(pp. 23 – 24). However, she only refers brieﬂy to the previous German occupation of Ukraine in
1918 (the ‘puppet regime’ of Pavlo Skoropads’kyi—p. 21), and her remarks about the economic
exploitation of Ukraine in 1941 – 43 are also relatively brief (pp. 114 – 117). Lower quickly
decides that the analogy with British rule in India does not really work. Ultimately, racial policy
trumped these plans.
Nazi policies and practices in Ukraine took a course that veered dramatically from British
rule in India. As patronising as German leaders were, they totally ruled out a ‘civilizing
mission’ of peoples they deemed racially inferior. They destroyed the local elites and
depopulated the territory (p. 27).
Hitler’s priority was ‘to break the giant [Soviet] cake into manageable pieces, so that we
can, ﬁrst, govern, secondly administer, and thirdly exploit it’ (quoted on p. 98, emphasis in
original).
However, it was in this area that the ‘ﬂy-by night atmosphere of the regional administration’
(p. 100) was most apparent. Diﬀerent agencies pursued diﬀerent policies, but overall there
was nothing remotely resembling a project even capable of reconciling Ukrainians to passive
obedience. The Church was initially given more freedom, but the occupiers failed to deliver on
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
Vol. 59, No. 5, July 2007, 873 – 881
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/07/050873-09 ª 2007 University of Glasgow
DOI: 10.1080/09668130701377748
early promises to abolish the collective farms. Many Ukrainians collaborated, but mainly for
negative reasons, or simply to survive. Lower argues that ‘the Germans did not conquer a
Ukrainian government, and this fact made it all the easier for many Ukrainians to join the
German administration without feeling as if they were national traitors’ (p. 205). Many of course
resisted, but Lower sensibly does not make this the main story. Her remarks about the
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) are sensible and skilfully sidestep entrenched
propaganda positions.
Because of Hitler’s and Himmler’s frequent presence in Zhytomyr, the percentage of local
Jews who perished in the Holocaust was appallingly high. Moreover, as Lower points out,
‘the vast majority died at gunpoint. They were not deported to distant locales; instead, they
perished in or near their home-towns . . . there was nothing impersonal about the Nazi killing
process here, in contrast to the factory-style gassing facilities of Auschwitz-Birkenau’ (p. 69).
Local forces were chillingly zealous, even after the Einsatzgruppen had moved on as the
front-line advanced. Initially the SS-Police provided the main stimulus, but a collaborative
division of labour enmeshed the Wehrmacht too (pp. 78 – 83). ‘Even in the ﬁnal hours of
their rule, [in January 1944] German oﬃcials continued to hunt for every last Jew’ (p. 200).
Lower does not allow the many truly appalling individuals who drove the implementation of
the Holocaust in Ukraine to escape from moral censure—like the Higher SS and Police head
Friedrich Jeckeln and Paul Blobel the chief of Sonderkommando 4a (who ‘demanded that all
members of his staﬀ—including cooks, drivers and clerks—take on the role of executioner’,
p. 73).
Zhytomyr was also central to Nazi colonisation plans in Ukraine. Himmler imagined long-
term German settlement around L’viv as a spillover from occupied Poland, in Crimea
(‘Gotenland’) and in east Ukraine (‘Halbstadt’). Zhytomyr was also envisaged as a judenfreie
model settlement for Volksdeutschen from Ukraine, dubbed ‘Hegewald’, or ‘game reserve’.
Lower’s insightful judgement, however, is that
when regional leaders approached the more vaguely deﬁned project of ‘Germanization’ they
proved to be less capable of realizing the elite’s intentions . . . at the lower levels a typical
German oﬃcial knew how to ‘deal with the Jews’ and was generally willing to do what was
expected of him. The ethnic German policy, on the other hand, did not generate the same
kind of consensus; it stimulated, instead, improvisation and chaos (p. 204).
Only 10,000 Volksdeutschen were persuaded, or coerced, to settle in Hegewald rather than the
planned 40,000. Even they were shunted around; few were ‘protected’ from reprisals in 1943.
German administrators often preferred ethnic Ukrainians, who were thought to be more diligent
or better educated (p. 42).
The book is actually quite short for a study of this type. It is not always obvious
how the three main themes interact. Many Ukrainians participated in the Holocaust,
but how many more did it repel? More than 100,000 POWs died at Bogun’ia near Berdychiv
(p. 100), most of whom were Ukrainian. The Holocaust was obviously both an integral
part of, and an obstacle to the successful implementation of, Generalplan Ost. One reason
why the Holocaust was so appalling in the region was the desire to prepare the ground for
Hegewald, and to impress the visiting Hitler. Nevertheless, Wendy Lower has provided an
excellent study that bravely attempts to put the Nazi occupation of Ukraine in comparative
context, and uses newly opened archives to extend our knowledge of the true horror of
the era.
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London ANDREW WILSON
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Regina Smyth, Candidate Strategies and Electoral Competition in the Russian Federation:
Democracy without Foundation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 260 pp.,
£48.00 h/b.
REGINA SMYTH HAS PRODUCED A SOPHISTICATED STUDY OF AN important and hitherto
unexamined aspect of Russian electoral behaviour, the choices made by candidates in Russian
Duma elections. Smyth argues that the Russian experience highlights a ﬂaw in the theory of
democratic consolidation by showing that electoral competition is not suﬃcient to ensure
successful consolidation. She argues that although there have now been four competitive
legislative elections since the collapse of communism, Russia has moved in an authoritarian
direction rather than towards the consolidation of democracy. She seeks to explain this by
looking at the choices candidates make with regard to four issues: whether or not to run for
oﬃce, whether to aﬃliate with a party or run as an independent, whether to run only in a single
member district, only on a party list or on both, and what to emphasise during the campaign—
personal qualities, personal policy preferences or party platform. Her argument is that the
choices candidates make on these four issues can either contribute to the strengthening of key
electoral and representative institutions of democracy (what she calls electoral infrastructure), or
undermine them, and that in Russia those choices have mainly had the latter eﬀect. So this is an
argument that assumes that the cumulative eﬀect of individual candidates’ decisions has led to
the inchoate and undeveloped party system in Russia, and that this has been a principal factor in
propelling the system in an authoritarian direction.
There is much to recommend this argument. To the extent that candidates refuse either to join
parties or, when they do, to tailor their behaviour to the party to which they belong, the outcome
of their actions is to weaken the party system. For example, a party-aﬃliated candidate who
emphasises their own policy preferences and qualities rather than the party programme, who
gains resources (and thereby obligations) to mount their election campaign from sources other
than the party’s, and who changes their party aﬃliation either during the campaign or once they
are in the legislature, weakens both the party’s image in the electorate and its capacity to
function as an eﬀective party. By acting as quasi-autonomous agents, candidates undercut party
development, thereby hampering the growth of institutions essential for democracy and
weakening the barriers against attempts by Putin to decrease the competitiveness of the Russian
electoral process.
This is an excellent analysis of major trends in the political process at the ground level, and it is
a convincing explanation of how candidates’ choices aﬀect the development of electoral
infrastructure. However the more general argument appears exaggerated in three ways. First,
few would argue that competitive elections alone are suﬃcient to bring about democratic
consolidation. Other things are clearly necessary, including most importantly the growth of civil
society, and all that that involves. The growth of civil society is fundamental for the development
of a truly competitive electoral system, and regardless of how formally democratic the electoral
engineering is, unless such a society exists as its basis, that electoral machinery is likely to
founder. Indeed, the absence of civil society, and of deﬁned interest constituencies, is one reason
why Russian candidates act in the way Smyth describes. In this sense, candidates’ choices are in
part a result of broader social factors which themselves hinder democratic development.
Second, it is clear that the drift in an authoritarian direction has been propelled in signiﬁcant
measure by decisions taken by political elites. Smyth has pointed to the important part played by
President Putin and those around him in shaping Russia’s more recent trajectory in an
authoritarian direction, but she fails to acknowledge the way in which the inchoateness of the
party system is also a function of decisions made at the top, not just the bottom. The structure of
the formal election system and its manipulation for partisan ends, which has undercut its
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integrity and hindered its democratic growth, stem from decisions made by successive presidents
and their supporters. This has compromised the whole structure. Furthermore party leaders have
also been important. Two examples highlight this. The lack of deﬁnition of what a party stands
for may in part be a function of the failure of the leader to articulate a clear policy. In the lead up
to the 1995 election, Communist leader Zyuganov clearly tailored his message to his audience,
saying quite diﬀerent things to the Moscow business constituency compared with what he was
saying to workers in the rust-bucket factories of southern Russia. And the failure of the liberals
to develop any stable coordination or cooperation, let alone a single party structure, in part
results from the personal positions and actions taken by leading liberal politicians like Yabloko
leader Grigorii Yavlinsky.
Third it is also not clear that all candidates have the sort of freedom to choose on the issues
under review that Smyth suggests. In her own work she acknowledges the way in which regional
governors were co-opted into United Russia and were then propelled into the legislature. There
has been widespread recruitment of candidates and would-be candidates by party oﬃcials.
Similarly many governors were able to develop political machines through which they controlled
their regions, including structuring the electoral context in those regions. Both are examples of
the way in which decisions about candidates’ electoral strategies were structured by higher level
authorities rather than being simply a function of the self-regarding actions of the candidates
themselves.
Notwithstanding these points, this is an excellent study of candidates and the strategies they
adopt and is a major contribution to our understanding of the development of the Russian
electoral system.
University of Sydney GRAEME GILL
Roger Gough, A Good Comrade. Ja´nos Ka´da´r, Communism and Hungary. London & New York:
I. B. Tauris, 2006, xiiþ 323 pp., £24.50 h/b.
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION HAS SEEN the publication of
numerous books examining the fateful events of that October and November. Of these books,
Roger Gough’s, A Good Comrade, goes beyond merely describing the revolution, and sets the
event within the context of the broader, political career of one of its key ﬁgures, Ja´nos Ka´da´r.
Biographies are by their nature notoriously diﬃcult to write, but when they are expertly
researched and written, as Gough’s book is, they should provide not only an intimate insight
into the life of the individual in question, but they should also inform the reader of the events
which shaped that life. For Ka´da´r, the events that shaped his life and in particular his political
life—the trial and execution of La´szlo´ Rajk in 1949, the 1956 revolution, the execution of Imre
Nagy in 1958 and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—are all covered by
Gough. It is this that makes A Good Comrade much more than just a biography.
Gough generally avoids falling into the ‘bias’ trap of most biographers and as such provides a
critical yet sympathetic account of Ka´da´r as a man who appeared to constantly compromise as a
means to move Hungary forward on the road to becoming a successful socialist state. The reader
is left in no doubt that there was an element of ideological desire on the part of Ka´da´r for this to
be achieved. But at the same time, Gough is very clear in acknowledging that this ideological
desire was not in the same ‘international socialist’ vein as that of other political leaders, including
Hungary’s infamous Ma´tya´s Ra´kosi. Gough acknowledges a theme that Ka´da´r himself re-
counted on many an occasion, which suggested that building a socialist society was not for the
sake of ideology, but ‘because it ensures a better life for the people, and that the country and the
876 REVIEWS
nation ﬂourish’ (p. 135). Although Gough does not draw direct comparisons, his commentary
on Ka´da´r’s early life and in particular the diﬃculties faced by a young Ka´da´r, responsible for
his mother and step-brother, encourages the reader to believe that there may have been a
degree of truth to Ka´da´r’s sweetened perception of the socialist road. If this can be construed
as bias, thus portraying Ka´da´r in a particular light, then it is entirely unintentional on the part
of the author.
Where Gough is determined to inform the opinion of the reader is with regard to the impact
that the political events, as detailed above, had on Ka´da´r in terms of the decisions he made and
the relationships he formed with other senior political ﬁgures in Central and Eastern Europe,
and more importantly with the Soviet leadership in Moscow. What is interesting is that Gough
does not necessarily play to the suggestion held by over half of the respondents in a survey,
published 15 years after the country’s transition, that Ka´da´r was a ‘victim of circumstance’
(p. 255). Gough clearly acknowledges that Ka´da´r himself made the decision to accept the Soviet
oﬀer of leadership in 1956, to allow the trial and execution of Nagy to take place in 1958, and to
support the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. He made his choices because he believed
that they were the right ones at that time. As Ka´da´r said of his own actions concerning the role
he played in the events of 1956, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in New York (1960)
and subsequently carved into his tombstone: ‘I was where I had to be, and I did what I had to
do’ (p. 131 & 258).
It is not only the key historical events that Gough covers. He also examines the more
mundane, but equally important aspects of running a state, such as coordinating economic
policy and preventing the factionalisation of the party. These issues are signiﬁcant because in the
end, as Gough notes, it was as much Ka´da´r’s inability to successfully manage these domestic
concerns, such as his failure to keep the country’s rising economic debt burden in check, as it was
his age and failing health, that ultimately led to his downfall.
Gough proﬁciently utilises many sources of information, including material from archives
in Hungary, Russia and the USA; interviews with and documents belonging to Ka´da´r’s
colleagues and associates such as Gyo¨rgy Acze´l; and more conventional published primary
and secondary documents. In doing so he has produced an engaging and readable biography
detailing a skilful politician who, during 32 years of leadership in Hungary, successfully
consolidated his political position in the aftermath of 1956, began to develop relations with
the West while managing to prevent an excessive reaction from the Soviet leadership akin to
that of 1956 or 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and who introduced reforms that gave Hungarians a
greater degree of freedom than any other Eastern bloc nation. Gough also portrays Ka´da´r’s
emotional side, as a man inﬂuenced by the women in his life—his mother, Borba´la, and his
wife, Ma´ria—and as someone who often employed a degree of wit and indeed sarcasm when
dealing with colleagues and acquaintances. For example, Gough recounts the comment made
by Ka´da´r to former UK ambassador to Hungary, Peter Unwin; when Unwin made reference
to Ka´da´r’s clerical opponent Cardinal Jo´zsef Mindszenty; ‘Are you a Catholic or an
Anglican?’ and upon Unwin’s reply of Catholic, ‘We won’t tell them that in Whitehall’
(p. 231).
As a ﬁnal comment, Ka´da´r, ironically, has much in common with Mindszenty—something
which, if he were still alive, he would no doubt not be pleased to hear. Following Mindszenty’s
death in 1976, Pope Paul VI commented that he ‘was and certainly will continue to be a
contradictory ﬁgure, the object of veneration and of violent attacks’. For many this could also
describe Ka´da´r, a man viliﬁed for his involvement in betraying and crushing the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution, but who in 1999 was still voted the greatest twentieth century Hungarian ﬁgure
(p. xi). This, as Gough rightly notes, suggests a degree of ‘schizophrenia’ surrounding the
perception of Ka´da´r within contemporary Hungarian society (p. 254). Undoubtedly, Gough’s
book goes some way towards successfully explaining the reasons for this; but at the same time,
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Gough, unintentionally, raises the question of whether Hungary has yet properly come to terms
with Ka´da´r and his ‘leading role’ within the country’s communist past.
University of Glasgow EAMONN BUTLER
Bu¨lent Go¨kay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920 – 1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and
Communism. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, xivþ 184 pp., £70.00 h/b.
THE POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS TURKEY AND the relationship between the
Turkish leftist parties and the USSR have failed to attract scholarly attention over the
years. This neglect is a by-product of ideological confusion and deep divisions embedded in
Turkey’s radical politics. It is also linked to the long and harsh harassment the Turkish left
suﬀered throughout the Cold War years. Since the dissolution of the USSR there has been a
considerable relaxation, but that has not brought about scholarly research on the Turkish
Communist Party (TKP) and its place in the leftist politics of Turkey and Europe.
This lack of interest is awkward in many ways. Turkey occupied one of the most turbulent
NATO borders with the Soviet Union for almost a half-century. It also had early contact with
the Bolsheviks and nurtured a strong leftist movement, which especially ﬂourished under the
confrontational politics of the 1970s. In the light of this, Bu¨lent Go¨kay’s book is a very timely
eﬀort. Go¨kay provides a promising start with interesting questions about the bi-partisan Soviet
polices that supported indigenous communist movements while at the same time deepening ties
with their local enemies, the national liberalisation movements. However, the book loses its ﬂair
soon after the ﬁrst two chapters and reverts to a mere descriptive chronology.
One main shortcoming is its weak conceptualisation of Turkish communism and its
relationship with the USSR. Another is its lack of a diversity of sources and a generally weak
research methodology. There is no theoretical perspective to assist in interpreting the
descriptions, and no guide as to how we might learn from this case. Although the book starts
with an international relations approach blended with a sociology of the actors of change, in the
latter parts this gives way to a more vaguely general treatment of leftist politics. Similarly, the
analysis of the Soviet Union’s relationship with the Turkish Communist Party and other leftist
youth and trade union movements remains shallow and descriptive. The story turns into a
mundane treatment of two parallel histories, of Soviet foreign policy and of Turkey’s domestic
political changes.
Major questions remain untouched. We never learn to what extent the USSR had an inﬂuence
on the chronic fragmentation of the Turkish left. We would certainly like to know what inﬂuence
they had on the spiralling self-destructive militancy of the 1970s. And every observer of the scene
would seek insight into the critical question of the roots of inter-ethnic violence, which later fed
into the Kurdish separatist guerrilla movement, the PKK. The PKK’s ideology ﬁrst emerged
within the communist and leftist camps and it hardened as the movement grew after the 1980
military coup. Go¨kay does touch on the involvement of the state and its intelligence
organisations in the militarisation and mobilisation of the nationalist right and fascist groups,
but no special insight is oﬀered. That, too, is a missed opportunity when so much needs to be
explained about the nature and extent of reactionaries in the so-called ‘deep state’. The book
cites some new documents in relation to early Turkish – Soviet relations. However, overall
Go¨kay is strangely weak on Soviet sources on foreign policy and Turkish politics. His heavy
reliance on partisan newspapers and campaigning websites exposes his clear biases.
Go¨kay makes many claims based on ﬂimsy evidence. For example, he asserts that contrary to
the ‘oﬃcial history’, many Turkish Jews were handed over to the Nazis during the Second World
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War, a consequence of a form of Pan-Turkism that cultivated Nazi sympathy. Since there are
many non-oﬃcial academic studies of Turkish and European Jews and the degree of protection
they received from Turkish oﬃcials (See, for example Stanford Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust.
Turkey’s role in rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi persecution 1933 – 1945, NYU
Press, 1993), the author is amiss in failing to take these into account, especially since he fails to
reference his claims (on pp. 56 and 57).
Similarly, while all semi-academic accounts of the 1925 S¸eyh Said uprising in eastern Turkey
either take the view that it was at root a local militant religious revival or that S¸eyh Said was a
proto-Kurdish nationalist, it is wrong for Go¨kay (pp. 40 – 41) to call it a symbol of Kurdish
nationalism without any supporting evidence. Given the strong religious rhetoric and tribal
allegiances that characterised the movement, the reader hopes to see more evidence to support
this claim and its implied link with the political left. A similar uprising, the Basmachi revolts in
the Fergana Valley of Soviet Central Asia, took Soviet troops 10 years to suppress fully but
despite its apparent parallels it is never addressed in this book. That uprising was explicitly an
expression of religious and nationalistic resistance to Soviet power consolidation in Central Asia
and was much inﬂuenced by Tatar and Turkish intellectuals. One episode in this series of revolts
is brieﬂy mentioned merely as a reaction to the maltreatment of Islamic traditions and attacks on
veiled women by the Bolshevik forces (p. 37).
Anecdotes and snippets of interviews are scattered throughout the book but their rationale
and the methodology of their collection and selection are not at all obvious. A long transcription
of Henry Kissinger’s conversation on Cyprus could have been an appendix, since the author
does not provide any textual analysis of it (p. 102). However, the selection criteria of the four
long appendices are also not obvious and some are not well linked to the main text.
Given the intricacies of communist and left wing activities in the 1970s, one would expect a
robust treatment of central actors and ideological factions in the latter parts of the book.
Go¨kay’s poetic ending provides food for thought about a country and its intellectuals that have
a long history of ideological confrontation whose parameters have very often been determined
by outsiders, but the most interesting questions remain unanswered.
University of London GU¨L BERNA O¨ZCAN
George Sanford, Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory, BASEES/
Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. London & New York: Routledge,
2005, xviþ 250 pp., £65.00 h/b.
AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE MONOGRAPH ON THE 1940 MASSACRE OF 21,856 POLISH oﬃcers and
civilians at Katyn and other sites in the former Soviet Union is long overdue. George Sanford’s
volume is more than a valuable companion to the plethora of documents on ‘Katyn’ published in
Warsaw and Moscow since 1992. His commentary on the many facets of this compelling story of
murder, cover-up, exploitation, betrayal and indiﬀerence is insightful and, if not always
persuasive, worthy of consideration and debate.
The truth about ‘Katyn’ is no longer in dispute. In March 1940 the ruling elite of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—Andreyev, Beria, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Kalinin,
Mikoyan, Molotov and Zhdanov—following Stalin’s orders, collectively authorised the security
organs of the Soviet state to murder Polish prisoners of war. For the next two months
approximately 11% of the 200,000 POWs captured by the Red Army from September 1939 were
shot, one by one, in the back of the head. The victims, primarily reserve oﬃcers, mostly
professional men called up in the aftermath of the Nazi – Soviet invasions of their country, were
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buried in great secrecy. The NKVD operation was not unusual by Soviet standards. About 7,300
Poles imprisoned in NKVD facilities in Ukraine and Belarus met their fate in the cellars. The
other 14,700 came from three POW camps. The men of Starobelsk were transported to the
NKVD prison in Kharkov, shot, and buried in a nearby park. Those from Ostashkov, including
5,000 ordinary policemen, were executed in Kalinin, now Tver, shipped back across the Volga,
and buried in the village of Mednoe. The remains of the 4,400 prisoners from Kozelsk were
buried near Smolensk in the Katyn forest. Among the dead was the lone woman slaughtered in
the massacres, Sub-lieutenant Janina Lewandowska, as well as Jakub Wajda, the father of the
celebrated ﬁlm director Andrzej Wajda.
The mass grave at Katyn, discovered in April 1943 by the Germans, who exploited the tragedy
to deﬂect attention away from their atrocities in the east, became the subject of numerous
international inquiries and intrigues during the Second World War and the Cold War. The
Kremlin (later supported by their Polish communist allies) naturally blamed the Nazis for the
massacre. The Anglo –American allies betrayed their junior partner, the Polish government-in-
exile, and opted instead to join the conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. Realpolitik—
moralism cum indiﬀerence—ruled the day. Appeals for justice by the London Poles and the
relatives of the victims fell on deaf ears until 1952, when the US congress ﬁnally condemned the
Soviet war crime. British oﬃcials, ‘defending the indefensible’ (p. 166), Sanford reminds us, were
among the most stubborn of those holding out. But it is here that Sanford also falters. Unwilling
to take the next step, he does not consider the possibility that the Foreign Oﬃce and a good
portion of British academic opinion at the time, and well into the 1980s, was anti-Polish and anti
anti-Soviet. Why is this important? Because I agree with Sanford, that ‘larger historical
outcomes’ cannot explain the 1940 massacre ‘and that one has to focus strictly on the context of
the time’ (p. 84).
On Stalin’s motives, discussed in the latter part of Chapter 4, Sanford’s reasoning is
frustrating. After dismissing numerous interpretations oﬀered to date, some odd and others
serious, he concludes, upon reviewing the NKVD documents, that the Soviets found the Polish
reservists ﬁercely independent, hopelessly anti-communist, and unwilling to collaborate in large
enough numbers. In the eyes of the perpetrators, this made them unsuitable as forced labour in
the European parts of the Soviet empire while the cost of maintaining them in the camps or
moving them elsewhere was prohibitive. Shooting them was cost-eﬀective. Here, Sanford places
too much emphasis on Stalin as a rational actor. I too have followed the new evidence about
Stalin and three facts about the dictator have become crystal clear to me: (1) sometime before the
Great Terror Stalin became clinically paranoid; (2) around the same time he began to manifest a
latent anti-Semitism; and (3) the archives that have been reviewed by scholars to date do not
contain unequivocal evidence to prove point (1) or (2). Still, can we reject paranoia and anti-
Semitism as explanations (and as a motive), even if others exist, for example, of Stalin’s
murderous obsession with non-existent ‘Trotskyite’ conspiracies? How about Stalin’s
determination to pursue the 1952 secret trial of the Jewish Antifascist Committee or his
decision to pursue the ‘Jewish’ Doctors’ Plot of 1953? Nationality mattered to these people and
ethnic hatred, what Sanford calls ‘Stalin’s polonophobia and resentments concerning the 1920
war’ (p. 83), also played its part.
If historical complexity and nuance is the victim when arguing that the Soviet leadership
massacred their Polish prisoners of war because they were Poles, it is no less simplistic to trumpet
the cries of communist fanatics who place the blame ﬁrmly on the victims because of an
ideological predisposition to view them as bourgeois counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the
people (and, therefore, technically outside the parameters of the Genocide Convention of 1948).
Racism and xenophobia, just like anti-Semitism, did not disappear in Soviet Russia in 1917. In
1940 it was alive and well inside the Kremlin and throughout the multinational empire Stalin
created. The fact that Stalin airbrushed out of existence many of his own racist and anti-Semitic
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remarks from the historical record he so keenly controlled and managed should tell us
something. The new evidence—the archival record—does indeed place a burden on historians
and social scientists to limit their imaginations, but that record should not be used to cleanse
other truths because political correctness, then and now, conveniently helps to obfuscate what
people really thought about others—neighbours—they were killing.
The most original and the best part of the book (from Chapter 6 to the Conclusion) deals with
the sordid attempts by politicians and bureaucrats, who represented all kinds of political
persuasions, to erase, manipulate, manage and control the memory of this horrendous war
crime. This part is especially worth reading and rereading.
Hamilton, Canada LESZEK GŁUCHOWSKI
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